No Metaphysical Disagreement Without Logical Incompatibility
(Daniel Durante, UFRN)
The purpose of this talk is to support the logical incompatibility of the opposing views as a criterion for characterizing disagreements as genuinely metaphysical. That is, I intend to argue that a specific dispute is a metaphysical disagreement only when the conflicting views are governed by different logics. If correct, this criterion would not only help to separate merely verbal from genuine metaphysical debates, but it also would ground an argument against deflationism, guaranteeing the substantiality and relevance of metaphysics. I intend to clarify the criterion, to present its basic foundations and commitments, to give some logical and metaphysical motivations for its adoption and some examples of its application.
Click for slides.
Obs: this talk has been exceptionally recorded at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Bergen (Norway) in joint work with the Bergen Logic Group.
The present recording has been realized with support from the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES, Brazil).
Click for slides.
Obs: this talk has been exceptionally recorded at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Bergen (Norway) in joint work with the Bergen Logic Group.
The present recording has been realized with support from the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES, Brazil).
