Anti-Exceptionalism and Metaphysics
(Michaela McSweeney, Boston University)
Anti-exceptionalists think some combination of the following things: logic isn’t special, we don’t know about it a priori, inquiry into logic is continuous with inquiry into everything else (and typically: specifically with scientific inquiry), and so on. I think anti-exceptionalism is true, but in this talk I’ll explore some problems with how this thesis intersects with the metaphysics of logic, and specifically, whether a kind of robust metaphysical realism about logic causes problems for the anti-exceptionalist.
Click for handout.
Obs: this talk has been exceptionally recorded at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Bergen (Norway) in joint work with the Bergen Logic Group.
The present recording has been realized with support from the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES, Brazil).
Click for handout.
Obs: this talk has been exceptionally recorded at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Bergen (Norway) in joint work with the Bergen Logic Group.
The present recording has been realized with support from the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES, Brazil).
